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The plaintiff/appellee, Ron Bellonio, pursuant to Rule 24 (b) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits the following 
Appellee's Brief. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(k). This is an interlocutory appeal 
from an Order of the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt 
Lake County, Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding. 
That Order denied Salt Lake City's ("City") Motion to Dismiss. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues on appeal involve legal conclusions by the trial 
court. Those legal conclusions will be given no deference by this 
Court and will be reviewed for legal correctness. T.R.F. v. Felan, 
760 P.2d 138 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
The interpretation of the following statutory provisions is 
determinative of the issues on appeal. The language of these 
designated statutes is set out in the Addendum to this Appellee's 
Brief, pursuant to Rule 24 (f) (2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure: 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-11 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-14 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-15 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case 
This is a personal injury claim, alleging that the City 
was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of 
Bellonio's injuries, sustained in a trip and fall in the parking 
terrace at the Salt Lake International Airport on June 14, 1992. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The complaint was filed in the Third Judicial District Court 
on June 14, 1994. On December 26, 1994, defendants, Salt Lake 
Airport Authority and Salt Lake City Corporation, moved the court 
to dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1) and 12(h) (2). The court 
dismissed the Salt Lake Airport Authority as a defendant because it 
is a division of, and not a separate entity from, Salt Lake City 
Corporation. Salt Lake City Corporations motion to dismiss was 
denied. 
Pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Salt Lake City Corporation petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for 
permission to appeal from the trial court's interlocurotry order. 
On April 17, 1995, the Utah Supreme Court granted the petition and 
poured over the case to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
C. Statement of Facts 
In addition to the facts listed by the City in its Brief, 
these additional facts are material. 
1. On June 14, 1992, Bellonio was injured when he tripped 
and fell in the parking terrace at the Salt Lake International 
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Airport. The City's "Medicial Assist Report" substantiates the 
date of that injury. (R.44). 
2. On July 9, 1992, Mr. Rex Curtis Bush, Attorney at Law, 
who had been previously retained by Bellonio, corresponded with Mr. 
Robert M. Kern, Attorney at Law, who was an attorney representing 
the Airport Authority. Mr. Kern responded that he represented the 
Authority and that communication should be directed to him. (R.45). 
3. On December 7, 1992, Mr. Edward D. Flint, Attorney at 
Law, who had by that time been engaged by Bellonio relative to his 
June 14, 1992 injuries, wrote a letter to Mr. Gene Jones of the 
Salt Lake City Airport Authority, notifying the Airport Authority, 
through Mr. Jones, that he, Mr. Flint, was Plaintiff's attorney at 
that time (R.46). 
4. On December 14, 1994, Mr. Russell Pack, Salt Lake City 
Airport Authority Property Manager, corresponded with Mr. Flint, 
and informed him that all further contact with the Airport 
Authority in connection with Mr. Bellonio's claims should be 
directed to the law firm of Kern and Wooley, in Los Angeles, 
California. (R.47). 
5. Via letter dated December 22, 1992, Mr. Robert M. Kern 
Attorney at Law, instructed Mr. Flint to direct all future 
correspondence relative to Bellonio's claims against the Airport or 
City directly to Mr. Kern. (R.48). 
6. Mr. Flint, on Belloniofs behalf, and Mr.Kern, on the 
City's behalf, exchanged further correspondence relative to 
Belloniofs claims in December, 1992 and January 1993. (R.49-51). 
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7. On March 24, 1993, Mr. Flint, on Bellonio's behalf, wrote 
again to Mr. Kern, the City's representative, and set forth the 
basis of Bellonio's claims against the Airport/City, including the 
nature of Bellonio's claims and his theories of the City's 
liability. At the same time, Mr. Flint sent to Mr. Kern a summary 
of medical treatments and expenses, as well as copies of Bellonio's 
to date medical bills. (R.52-53). 
8. On June 11, 1993, Mr. Flint, for reasons unknown to 
Bellonio and his current counsel, prepared and had Bellonio sign a 
document entitled "Notice of Intent to Commence Legal Action. . .", 
Mr. Flint then arranged for the mailing of the same document to the 
persons and entities reflected in the document's mailing 
certificate. (R.27-29). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Bellonio has fully complied with the notice provisions of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Both the March 24, 1993 letter 
submitted to an agent of the City, as well as the formal Notice of 
Claim submitted on June 11, 1993 satisfy those notice requirements. 
The facts of this case, as well as Utah case law, support that the 
individuals served are appropriate parties to serve under the 
statute and represent those with authority to administer, control, 
direct, and manage the affairs of the Airport Authority and the 
City. 
Bellonio has adequetly set forth in those notices the extent 
of his damages. All medical bills and records were in possession 
of the City's agent at the time the notices were submitted. The 
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injury is specifically designated in the Notice of Intent, The 
facts of this case and Utah case law support that Bellonio has 
adequetely detailed his damages under the Act. 
All purposes of the notice provisions of the Act have been 
satisfied in this case. The early notice given by Bellonio of his 
claim allowed the appropriate governmental entities to investigate 
and evaluate the claim. Informal discovery and exchange of 
liability and medical documentation allowed for the review of the 
claim to move forward quickly, The trial court's denial of the 
Cityfs Motion to Dismiss did not, in any way, subvert the purposes 
of the Act. 
Bellonio1s formal complaint was timely-filed. A governmental 
entity may not unilaterally trigger the time limitations of the Act 
by submitting a written denial of liability before a notice of 
claim is filed. Such a procedure would allow a governmental entity 
unilaterally to reduce, by almost half, the time requirements 
allowed a claimant to pursue a claim under the Act. Whether based 
on the March 24, 1993 letter or the June 11, 1993 Notice of Claim, 
the plaintiff's complaint, filed on June 14, 1994, was timely under 
the Act. 
Finally, based on the facts of this case and Utah case law, 
assuming, without admitting, technical defects in Bellonio's Notice 
of Claim, the City has waived any such defects. This waiver is 
based on its continued negotiation, investigation, and evaluation 
of the claim without any objection as to defective notice. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BELLONIO FULLY COMPLIED WITH THE NOTICE OF 
CLAIM PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT 
Before addressing the City's specific allegations of how 
Bellonio's notice of claim filing was defective, a review of the 
purpose of the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act 
("Act") is important. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Galleaos v. Midvale, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972), the notice requirements 
of the Act are designed "to alert the public authority so that a 
proper and timely investigation of the claim can be made." id. at 
1337. The City cannot argue that purpose was not accomplished in 
this case. Correspondence and the exchange of information and 
documentation that went on even before the Notice of Claim was 
filed is evidence of the extent of the investigation conducted by 
the City. In Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480 
(Utah 1975), the Supreme Court stated that full compliance with the 
requirements of the notice of claim statute consists of: 
. . .Prior to filing suite, a claim must be 
filed which (1) is in writing, (2) states the 
facts and the nature of the claim, (3) is 
signed by the claimant, (4) is directed and 
delivered to someone authorized to receive it, 
and (5) has been filed within the prescribed 
time. 
Bellonio fully complied with those provisions both in the 
March 24, 1993 letter his then attorney Flint wrote to Mr. Kern, 
and in the July 11, 1993 Notice of Claim. Each of those documents 
was in writing. Each stated the facts and nature of Bellonio's 
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claims. The March 24, 1993 letter was signed by Belloniofs then 
attorney. The June 11, 1993 Notice of Claim was signed by 
Bellonio. Both documents were mailed to Mr. Kern, who had 
previously represented on numerous occassions to Bellonio and his 
representatives that he was authorized to receive "all future 
correspondence" related to the claim. In three separate letters, 
Bellonio was directed to submit all future correspondence to Mr. 
Kern, the authorized agent of the City. 
Bellonio has fully complied with the notice of claim 
requirements of the Act. The trial court was correct in denying 
the City's Motion to Dismiss. Now to address the specific 
allegations of the City as to why Bellonio did not comply with the 
notice provisions of the Act. 
A. Bellonio Has Complied With The Act By Serving 
The Notice Of Claim Upon Roger Cutler, City 
Attorney; Louis Miller, Director Salt Lake 
City Airport Authority, And RM Kern, Attorney 
For The Airport Authority. 
The City does not argue that Bellonio is guilty of no 
compliance with the notice of claim requirements of Utah Code Ann. 
§63-30-13. The City does not argue that the June 11, 1993 Notice 
of Claim was untimely, except as will be addressed later. The City 
argues defective compliance with the notice of claim requirements, 
first, because the Notice of Claim was not filed with the 
"governing body" of the City. Bellonio served his Notice of Claim 
upon Roger Cutler, City Attorney, Salt Lake City Corporation; Louis 
Miller, Director, Salt Lake City Airport Authority; and R.M. Kern, 
Esq., Designated Attorney for the Airport Authority. The City 
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argues that service on these individuals cannot be deemed service 
on the "governing body" of the political subdivision, whether that 
subdivision be the Airport Authority or the City. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13 provides that a claim against a 
political subdivision is barred unless notice of claim "is filed 
with the governing body of the political subdivision within one 
year after the claim arises. . . . " Decisions of this Court and 
Utah statutes support that, under the circumstances of this case, 
Bellonio has satisfied the notice of claim requirements of Utah 
Code Ann. §63-30-13. Utah Code Ann. §68-3-2 provides, in pertinent 
part, as follows: 
The rule of the common law that statutes in 
derogation thereof are to be strictly 
construed has no application to the statutes 
of this state. The statutes establish the 
laws of the state respecting the subjects to 
which they relate, and their provisions and 
all proceedings under them are to be liberally 
construed with a view to effect the objects of 
the statutes and to promote justice. 
Nowhere in the Governmental Imunity Act is the term "governing 
body" of a political subdivision defined. The City attempts to use 
a definition of "governing body" set forth in the Utah Municiple 
Code, Utah Code Ann. §10-1-101 et seq. Utah Code Ann. §10-1-104, 
however, makes it clear that the definition of "governing body" is 
limited to "as used in this act". Nowhere in the Utah Municiple 
Code or in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act has the legislature 
stated that the definition of "governing body" in the Utah 
Municipal Act is applied when construing the term "governing body" 
as it applies to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Certainly, if 
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the legislature had intended for that definition to apply, it could 
easily have said so. The legislature could just as easily have 
defined "governing body" in the Governmental Immunity Act itself. 
The legislature has not done that. In that regard, this case is 
most similar to the decision of this Court in Brittain v. State of 
Utah, 882 P.2d 666 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
In Brittain, the plaintiff pursued claims against the Utah 
Department of Employment Security and the Utah Division of 
Facilities, Construction, and Management. Brittain filed notices 
of claim under Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12 with the Attorney General 
and the Division of Risk Management. The State filed a motion to 
dismiss on the ground that Brittain had failed to file a notice of 
claim with either the Department of Employment Security or the 
Division of Facilities, Construction, and Management, as required 
by the Governmental Immunity Act. The statute provides that a 
notice of claim be filed with the Attorney General and "the agency 
concerned". Addressing that issue, this Court stated: 
Because the term "agency concerned" is not 
clear on its face, we will interpret the 
notice requirement of section 63-30-12 in a 
manner consistent with the overall purpose of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. As 
explained by the Utah Supreme Court "[i]t is 
necessary to consider the policy of the notice 
requirement so that in any particular case the 
facts can be evaluated to determine if the 
intent of the statute has been accomplished." 
Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480, 
482 (Utah 1980). 
The primary purpose of a notice of claim 
requirement is to afford the responsible 
public authorities an oportunity to pursue a 
proper and timely investigation of the merits 
of a claim and to arrive at a timely 
settlement, if appropriate, thereby avoiding 
the expendeture of public revenue for costly 
and unnecessary litigation." (Citations 
omitted). 
Id, at 668. 
Like the term "governing body", the term "agency concerned" in 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-12 is not defined in the statute. This Court 
turned to the commonly understood dictionary meaning, "interested" 
and concluded that the statutory notice of claim requirement was 
met by filing notice "with any one of potentially several agencies 
with a legitimate interest in plaintiff's claim and the legal 
proceedings which might result therefrom." 3j|. at 668. 
In an important final paragraph, in language directly 
applicable to the facts of this case on appeal, this Court 
concluded: 
Finally, we wish to reiterate that this is not 
a case where the notice of claim was defective 
in form or content. Recognizing the need for 
written notice to protect against the 
unreliability of memory, the notice of claim 
was preserved in writing, accurately recording 
Brittain's account of the accident. This is 
also not a case where plaintiff either gave no 
notice or filed only one of two required 
notices. . . Finally, this is not a case where 
notice of claim was not filed within the one-
year period. It is undisputed that plaintiff 
sent both notices well within one year from 
the date his claim arose. 
Id. at 669 
Those same facts exist in this case. While there are some 
factual differences between this case and the Brittain case, the 
reasoning of that case controls these facts. 
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The major difference between this case and the Brittain case 
is that this case involves a claim against a political subdivision, 
as opposed to a claim against the State. The language of the Act 
requires that when pursuing a claim against a political 
subdivision, the notice of claim is to be filed "with the governing 
body of the political subdivision." As mentioned before, the term 
"governing body" is not defined in the Act. Common dictionary 
meaning of the word "govern" includes the terms "administer", 
"direct", "control", and "manage". Websters New World Dictionary, 
Second College Edition, p.604 (1979). 
Just as a corporation can only act through individuals, 
service upon any "governing body" must be made upon an individual. 
In this case, service was made on Roger Cutler, the City Attorney 
for Salt Lake City Corporation; on Louis Miller, Director of the 
Airport Authority; and upon R.M. Kern, Esq., the attorney for the 
Airport Authority. Certainly, service upon those individuals and 
the organiztions they represent constitutes service on those with 
power to administer, direct, control, and manage the interests of 
the City and the Airport Authority generally and, specifically, 
with regard to this personal injury claim. In a letter dated July 
22, 1992, to Bellonio's then attorney Rex Bush, Mr. Kern states "we 
represent the Salt Lake City Airport Authority and your letter 
dated July 9, 1992, concerning the captioned claimant, has been 
forwarded to us for response. . . Please communicate directly to 
this office." (R.45). On December 22, 1992, Mr. Kern sent a 
letter to Bellonio's then attorney Edward Flint stating "we act as 
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Salt Lake City Airport Authoritiy!s counsel. Please direct all 
future correspondence directly to this office." (R.48). On 
January 4, 1993, Mr. Kern sent another letter to Mr. Flint stating 
"you are correct, as indicated in our letter of 22 December 1992, 
that all future correspondence should be directed to this firm." 
(R.51). 
It is clear from that correspondence that Kern had been 
assigned responsiblity for this claim by the Airport Authority and 
the City and was acting as their authorized agent. Bellonio was 
consistently instructed to direct all correspondence to Mr. Kern, 
as agent for the political subdivisions. In addition to sending 
the Notice of Claim to Mr. Kern, Bellonio also sent the Notice of 
Claim to the Director of the Airport Authority and the Attorney for 
Salt Lake City Corporation. 
The facts and circumstances of Belloniofs service of the 
Notice of Claim, coupled with the reasoning of this Court in 
Brittain, make it clear that Bellonio?s Notice of Claim service 
satisfies the requirements of Utah Code Ann, §63-30-13. The trial 
court's denial of the City's Motion to Dismiss should be affirmed. 
B. Belloniofs Damages Are Adequetly Set Forth In 
The March 24, 1993 Notice And The June 11, 
1993 Notice Of Claim. 
The City next argues that Belloniofs notice is fatally flawed 
because it does not set forth a recitation of his damages. The Act 
requires simply that the claimant set forth "the damages incurred 
by the claimant so far as they are known." Utah Code Ann.§63-30-
11. 
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On March 24, 1993, Edward Flint, then counsel for Bellonio, 
sent a letter to Mr. Kern specifically outlining liability issues 
and providing a synopsis of Belloniofs medical records and medical 
bills. (R. 52-53). That document itself satisfies all notice of 
claim requirements in this case. The June 11, 1993 Notice of Claim 
specifically states that "plaintiff then tripped over a curb as he 
reached the end of the crosswalk, fell and hit the pavement, 
sustaining injuries to his body as described by his medical 
providers." The specific documentation of the medical providers 
had been supplied to Mr. Kern two and a half months earlier. Under 
the circumstances, the statute's requirement that the claims set 
forth damages "so far as they are known" has been satisfied. 
The City's hypertechnical reading of the Act is not supported 
by decisions of the Utah Supreme Court. In Tooele Meat and Storage 
Co. v. Morse, 43 Utah 515, 136 P. 965, 966 (1913), the Supreme 
Court acknowledged that "the general rule with respect to notices 
is that mere informalities do not vitiate them so long as they do 
not mislead, and give the necessary information to the proper 
parties." In Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 63 Utah 589, 228 P. 213 
(1924), a case decided under formal law but still applicable 
precedent, the guardians of an 8-year old minor brought an action 
to recover for injuries sustained by the minor on one of the 
streets of the town of Bingham. The plaintiff was required to file 
a statutory notice of claim. In the course of its opinion, the 
Supreme Court made these observations applicable to this case: 
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After all, as we conceive the purpose of the 
law, when the injured party has presented his 
claim stating the time, place, cause and 
circumstances of his injury and the extent of 
his damage as far is as known to him, he has 
fairly and fully complied with the spirit and 
intent of the statute. But this is a far cry 
from excusing the failure to present any 
underlying claim at all within the limit fixed 
by law. There is a wide distinction between 
presenting a defective claim which at least 
names the place, time, and circumstances of 
the injury and in presenting no claim at all. 
In the first supposed case the municipality is 
at least notified sufficiently to investigate 
the merits of the claim, which, evidentally is 
the main purpose of the statute. In the 
second supposed case the city receives no 
notice at all, and the very purpose of the 
statute is defeated. 
Id. at 214-15 
In this case, the City has been on notice of this claim 
virtually from the claim's inception and was in actual possession 
of medical bills and records well before the filing of the document 
titled Notice of Claim. The fundamental purposes and objectives of 
the notice requirements have been met. 
In Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d 362, 412 P.2d 449 
(1966), decided under former law but still applicable, a claim 
which stated the time, place, and nature of the injury and the 
sidewalk defect causing it, fulfilled the purposes of the former 
statute, even though the amount of damages was not stated. The 
former law required the claim to be filed within thirty days and 
the Spencer court found that the damages were impossible to 
assertain within that period of time. In this case, although the 
exact amount of damages was not set forth, because the full extent 
of damage was not known at the time, the injury was listed and 
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actual medical expenses and bills had been provided to the City's 
agent. The City was clearly informed of the damages incurred up to 
that time by Bellonio. 
Bellonio was adequately complied with the statutory provision 
to identify his damages. The trial court's denial of the City's 
motion to dismiss on that ground should be affirmed. 
C. All Purposes Of The Governmental Immunity Act 
Have Been Satisfied In This Case 
The City next argues that the trial court' s denial of its 
Motion to Dismiss creates a standard of less than strict compliance 
with the Governmental Immunity Act and, therefore, defeats the 
purpose of the Act. The facts of this case defeat that argument. 
The City lists the purposes of the Act as (1) to allow the 
responsible government authority to promptly investigate and settle 
a claim before litigation; (2) to make the authority aware that a 
plaintiff actually intends to assert a claim; and (3) to protect 
against the passage of time obscuring memory and distorting a 
plaintiff's recollection of the events which were at the heart of 
the claim. 
It cannot seriously be disputed by the City that all of those 
purposes have been satisfied in this case. Bellonio notified the 
City of his claim long before he was required to file any formal 
Notice of Claim. The City began its investigation early on. 
Bellonio provided medical documentation and liability analysis 
through appropriate channels. The City seems to fault Bellonio for 
requesting discovery before filing the Notice of Claim. What's 
wrong with that? Shouldn't the parties try and exchange as much 
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relevant information as possible before going through the formal 
statutory procedures which ultimately lead to litigation? 
The City's entire argument that the trial court's ruling 
somehow subverts the purposes of the Act is unfounded. The trial 
court's ruling was proper and confirmed that all purposes of the 
Act have been served under the facts of this case. 
POINT II 
IF THE COURT FINDS THAT BELLONIO'S MARCH 23, 
1993 CORRESPONDENCE CONSTITUTES NOTICE OF HIS 
CLAIM, THE CITY'S DECEMBER 22, 1992 DENIAL OF 
LIABILITY STILL HAS NO EFFECT UNDER THE ACT. 
The City's final argument is that if Bellonio's March 23, 1993 
correspondence satisfies the notice provisions of the Act, then Mr. 
Kern's December 22, 1992 letter, denying liability for the 
incident, triggered the one year period within which Bellonio had 
to file his formal complaint. That argument is quickly disposed 
of. Nowhere in the Act is there a provision allowing a 
governmental entity to unilaterally trigger any of the time 
limitations of the Act before a notice of claim is filed. Such a 
procedure would turn the Act upside-down. It would allow a 
governmental entity to receive a letter of representation from a 
claimant's attorney, without the filing of any Notice of Claim, and 
then immediately deny the claim in writing. The governmental 
entity could then argue that the claim is barred one year after 
that written denial. At the same time, under the Act, the claimant 
would have that first year within which to file a notice of claim; 
then the period for the denial in writing or the ninety day denial 
period; and then have an additional year to file the complaint. 
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Under the City's argument, a governmental entity could unilaterally 
cut by almost half the time within which a claimant may pursue a 
governmental claim under the Act. 
The specific language of the Act unravels the City's argument. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-14 provides as follows: 
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim 
the governmental entity or its insurance 
carrier shall act thereon and notify the 
claimant in writing of its approval or denial. 
A claim shall be deemed to have been denied if 
at the end of the ninety-day period the 
governmental entity or its insurance carrier 
has failed to approve or deny the claim. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-15 (2) provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one 
year after denial of the claim or within one 
year after the denial period specified in this 
chapter has expired. . . . 
The only possible Notices of Claim at issue in this case are 
the March 24, 1993 letter and the June 11, 1993 Notice of Claim. 
It is undisputed that there was no formal denial in writing issued 
by the City after either of those dates. As such, the one year 
period for filing a formal complaint began to run ninety days after 
each of those notices were served. If the March 24, 1993 letter is 
deemed notice, the plaintiff had until June 24, 1994 to file his 
formal complaint. That complaint was filed on June 14, 1994 (R.2-
9). Based on the June 11, 1993 Notice of Claim, and the lack of 
written denial after that Notice of Claim, the plaintiff had until 
September 11, 1994 to file his formal complaint. Under either fact 
situation, the June 14, 1994 complaint was timely-filed. 
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POINT III 
THE CITY HAS WAIVED COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE 
OF CLAIM REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE ANN, §63-
30-13 
The record in this case indicates an ongoing negotiation 
regarding the claim, with informal exchanges of discovery requests 
(R.49-50), requests by the City for reports from Bellonio's 
engineering consultants and safety experts (R.54), and the 
submission of detailed liability analysis and all medical 
documentation (R.52-53). 
Under those circumstances, decisions of the Utah Supreme Court 
support that, even assuming, without admitting, that Bellonio's 
Notice of Claim was somehow technically defective, the City has 
waived any defect. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Bowman 
v, Oaden City, 93 P.561, 564 (Utah 1908): 
The plaintiff's claim was not properly made 
out as provided by the statute in several 
particulars, principally, because it was not 
verified, and the extent of his injury or 
damage not sufficiently described. The city 
council, however, did not decline to consider 
it, nor to investigate the facts, because the 
claim was not properly made out. On the 
contrary it treated the claim, and acted upon 
it, as though it had been in full compliance 
with the statute. In such case the defects of 
the claim presented were waived, and were not 
thereafter available as a defense to the 
action. 
For those reasons, even if this Court rejects Points I and II 
of this Brief, any technical defect in Bellonio's compliance with 
the notice of claim requirements of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13 have 
been waived by the City. 
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CONCLUSION 
Bellonio has complied with the notice of claim requirements of 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-11 et seq. Under the circumstances, the 
notice of claim was served upon the appropriate entities designated 
by the statute, Bellonio's damages were sufficiently set forth, and 
the purposes of the statute have been satisfied. The complaint in 
this case was timely-filed, as the one year period within which to 
file a complaint cannot unilaterally be triggered by the City's 
written denial of liability submitted before a notice of claim is 
filed. Finally, even assuming, without admitting, technical 
defects in Bellonio's notice of claim, the City has waived any such 
defect by its ongoing active participation in the investigation, 
evaluation, and negotiation of Bellonio's claim. 
Based on the above argument and authorities, the trial court 
did not err in denying the City's Motion to Dismiss. That trial 
court Order should be affirmed and this case remanded to the trial 
court to proceed on the merits. 
DATED this day of August, 1995. 
LEHMAN, JENSEN & DONAHUE, L.C. 
GORDON K. JENSEN 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed, first class postage pre-
paid to the following this day of August, 1995. 
Roger H. Bullock 
STRONG & HANNI 
600 Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
63-30-11. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — Service 
— Legal disability. 
( D A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the 
claim were against a private person begins to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or 
against an employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance 
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority shall 
file a wiitten notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, 
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is character-
ized as governmental. 
(3) (a; The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are 
known, 
tb) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent. 
attorney, parent, or legal guardian: and 
(ii) directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity 
according to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13. 
(4) (a> If the claimant is under the age of majority, or mentally incompe-
tent and without a legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the claim-
ant may apply to the court to extend the time for service of notice of 
claim. 
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court 
may extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the applica-
ble statute of limitations. 
to In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall 
consider whether the delay in serving the notice of claim will substan-
tially prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the 
merits. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, §11; 1978, ch. section designations in Subsection (3nb) and 
27, § 5: 1983, ch. 131, § 1; 1987, ch. 75, § 4; made related changes and deleted "or impns-
1991, ch. 76, $ 6. oned" after "legal guardian" and made related 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- changes in Subsection (4)(a). 
ment. effective April 29. 1991, added the sub-
63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its em-
ployee — Time for filing notice, 
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its employee for an act or 
omission occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is 
filed with the governing body of the political subdivision withm one year after 
the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted 
under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise 
to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, * 13; 1978, ch. Mailing claims to state or political subdivi-
27, * 7; 1983, ch. 131, * 3; 1987, ch. 75, * 6. sions * 63-37-1 et seq 
Cross-References. — Actions arising out of 
contractual rights or obligations not subject to 
this section. * 63-30-5 
63-30-14. Claim for injury — Approval or denial by gov-
ernmental entity or insurance carrier within 
ninety days. 
Within ninety days of the filing of a claim the governmental entity or its 
insurance carrier shall act thereon and notify the claimant in writing of its 
approval or denial. A claim shall be deemed to have been denied if at the end 
of the ninety-day period the governmental entity or its insurance carrier has 
failed to approve or deny the claim. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 14. 
63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury — Authority and time 
for filing action against governmental entity. 
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district 
court against the governmental entity or an employee of the entity. 
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the 
claim or within one year after the denial period specified m this chapter has 
expired, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, * 15: 1983, ch. 
129, * 6; 1985, ch. 82. * 2; 1987, ch. 75, * 7. 
FLINT & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys at Law 
EDWARD D. FLINT 
PAUL R. CHRISTENSEN 
M a r c h 2 4 , 1 9 9 3 
Robert Kernf Esq. 
Kern & Woolley 
10920 Wilshire Blvd. 
Los Angeles, CA 90024 
Re: My Client: Ronald Bellonio 
Date of Loss: 6/14/92 
Your Client: Salt Lake City Airport Authority 
Dear Mr. Kern: 
It has been some time since we last corresponded. In 
reviewing this file in preparation for filing a Notice of Intent 
to commence a legal action against a political subdivision of the 
State of Utah, I have noticed that youf on behalf of Salt Lake City 
Airport Authority, have denied that there is any legal liability 
imposed on your client. I have enclosed with this letter some 
information that would, as per your request, be considered facts 
to the contrary. 
In the most simple terms, the Airport Authority, and any other 
private or public building, organization, or entity with a massive 
parking area such as this where there are numerous entrances and 
exits to and from the buildings and the parking area, and where 
tens of thousands of people are expected to walk through and across 
the various points and across the various surfaces and structures, 
there is an affirmative duty to meet basic standards of 
construction and safety. One of those standards is to mark all 
curbs rising from street level at the point where the curb or 
elevated sidewalk intersects with a crosswalk which connects a 
building to a parking lot, across a roadway, for which pedestrians 
are expected to utilize in order to maintain uniformity of 
pedestrian and automobile traffic, and for the common safety of 
all. In this particular case, the curb rises from the street level 
where the crosswalk is, straight up approximately four inches from 
the street level, and has a wheelchair access area in the middle 
of the intersecting curb. The wheelchair access is approximately 
half the total width of the area of the crosswalk which intersects 
the curb. The remaining half of the crosswalk, with approximately 
one-fourth on either side of the wheelchair access, does not lower 
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to street level, and a wheelchair would have a difficult time going 
over this four-inch curb, regardless of the direction that the 
wheelchair pedestrian was traveling. 
Under these circumstances, the curb that rises back up to the 
four inches above street level point should be marked or painted 
in a bright color — as I understand, it should be painted yellow -
- in order to warn pedestrians that it is at a different level than 
the portion of the curb which intersects the crosswalk and it has 
been lowered to street level for wheelchair access. 
It is our contention that Mr. Bellonio was exiting the 
airport, had his arms filled with his baggage and was properly 
walking in the marked crosswalk area to reach his automobile when 
he was unable to see that part of the curb that intersects with 
the marked crosswalk was actually a four-inch high curb instead of 
a lowered flat "driveway or ramp" type of egress, and at that time, 
he tripped over the four-inch curb, fell and was seriously injured. 
It xs very reasonable to assume that an individual carrying luggage 
cannot see very well in areas where the luggage may be obstructing 
their vision and could not be expected to see that there was a curb 
that he would have to step up upon in order to avoid tripping over. 
There were no signs posted warning hi*n to step up, and the curb was 
not painted, which allowed the concrete curb that was four inches 
high to blend in and disappear with the lower part that was 
designed differently for wheelchair access. 
My engineering consultants and safety experts have advised me 
that this neglect on the part of the Airport Authority to have this 
curb properly marked is negligence, and that the Airport Authority 
should be held liable and responsible for the injuries sustained 
by Mr. Bellonio. I must ask you the converse of your earlier 
question, "What evidence do you have to the contrary that would 
indicate that the Airport Authority has no liability?" 
I have also included with this letter a synopsis of my 
client's medical expenses incurred to date, and copies of bills 
that are currently in my possession. Please respond in writing 
with either an offer to settle, an offer to accept liability and 
submit this matter to binding arbitration for the determination of 
damages, or a denial of liability, within two weeks of the date of 
this letter. If I do not hear from you, I will go ahead and file 
the required Notice of Intent to Commence Action, which is required 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 63-30-10, et. seq. I would be 
happy to answer any questions you may have concerning this claim. 
Very truly yours, 
EDWARD D. FLINT 
EDF:fmw 
RONALD F. BELLONIO 
Pro Se Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 571296 
Murray, Utah 84157 
Telephone: 649-6832 
JUN | 4 1993 
RONALD F. BELLONIO, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION 
and the SALT LAKE CITY : 
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT 
AUTHORITY, political sub-
divisions of the STATE OF UTAH 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO 
COMMENCE LEGAL ACTION 
AGAINST THE STATE OF UTAH 
OR ONE OF ITS POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISIONS 
(U.C.A. 63-30-11) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) : ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
1. GENERAL NATURE AND DESCRIPTION OF CLAIM- On June 14, 
1992, Plaintiff was leaving the Salt Lake City International 
Airport Terminal One with his luggage in hand, and was walking 
from the terminal to the parking terrace which had recently been 
completed. Plaintiff walked from the sidewalk onto a crosswalk 
painted on the through lane of traffic between the doors of the 
walkway leading to Terminal One and the main parking area. He 
entered the crosswalk from the sidewalk at street level and 
walked to the other side of the road, staying only and always 
completely within the crosswalk. Plaintiff then tripped over a 
curb as he reached the end of the crosswalk, fell and hit the 
pavement, sustaining injuries to his body as described by his 
medical providers. Plaintiff could not see the curb because it 
blended in with the wheelchair access which lowered the sidewalk 
and curb to street level in the center of the crosswalk. Plain-
tiff expected that the crosswalk would connect with the curb and 
sidewalk at street level, as it had where he entered the cross-
walk, but in fact, the crosswalk only intersected at street level 
with a portion of curb and sidewalk which was substantially 
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smaller than the width of the painted crosswalk. The curb was 
not marked in any manner, was not painted, was not made to look 
different than the area which did intersect the crosswalk at 
street level, and there were no other warnings or advisements 
present. 
This accident was investigated by the Airport Operations 
Division which concluded in its written report, Case No. 92-1242 
that MThe curb is in need of proper markings." Subsequently, the 
curbs were painted yellow and are more visible to pedestrians. 
THIS NOTICE is served upon the defendants, their agents or 
attorneys, pursuant to the requirements of Utah Code Ann. 63-30-
11 by Certified Mail, return receipt requested. 
DATED this / / • * day of Jo a^e 1993, 
VJ <C. 
Ronald F. "Bellbnio 
Subscribed and sworn to before me, the Plaintiff, Ronald F. 
Bellonio, who verified that the foregoing information is true and 
correct to the best of his information, knowledge and belief, on 
this /(-t*" day of June, 1993. 
S 1 C 9 S C C « ' : \ 
SaJt Lake City. • 
Wy Ccmmisi;: 
September' 
Ssioc:-. 
ROTARY PUBLIC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing Notice of Intent was 
served by U.S. Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested, postage 
pregjj.d, upon each of the following on the // ^ < day of 
. / LX yiC / 1993. 
Jan Graham, Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Salt-Lake City Corporation 
Roger Cutler, City Attorney 
451 South State, #505 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Salt Lake City Airport Authority 
Louis Miller, Director 
AMF Box 22084 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84122 
R.M. Kern, Esq. 
Kern & Wooley 
10920 Wilshire Boulevard 
Los Angeles, California 90024 
RONALD F. BfiLLONIO 
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•sirict 
CLARK A. HARMS (#5713) 
EARL SPAFTORD & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Trolley Corners, Suite 3-A 
515 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 363-1234 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
FEB 0 6 1995 
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Z*Gu?;C*aL 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RON BELLONIO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
SALT LAKE AIRPORT AUTHORITY, 
and SALT LAKE CITY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART, 
AND DENYING IN PART, 
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 940903841 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER came on for hearing before the 
above Coxirt on Friday, January 13, 1995, on Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint and causes of actions herein 
against each of the named Defendants. 
Plaintiff was present, and was represented by his attorney, 
Clark A. Harms. Defendants were each represented by thheir 
attorney, Roger H. Bullock, of the law firm of Strong & Hanni, 
P.C. The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Third District Court 
Judge, presided* 
The matter was called, and the respective arguments of 
counsel were presented. Based upon the pleadings and arguments 
of the parties and their respective counsel, the Court ORDERS as 
follows: 
1. Based upon Plaintiff's non-opposition, the SALT LAKE 
AIRPORT AUTHORITY, being a division of, and not a separate entity 
from Salt Lake City Corporation, said SALT LAKE AIRPORT AUTHORITY 
is hereby dismissed as a party and as a Defendant herein; and 
2. Defendant SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION'S Motion to 
Dismiss is hereby denied. 
c DATED this day of 1995. 
BY THE COURT 
JOMER* F. WILKINSON 
rDistrict Judge 
Approved as to form: 
STRONG S HaNNI, P.C. 
ROCE* 'HV^HLLOCK 
Attorney for Defendants 
ff:\login\belloaio\ dismiss.ord 
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